EGYPT: New Suez canal vs Toshka; similarity in the balance

Same political weft and warp

Sisi (New Suez Canal)

Presented as a solution to Egypt's economic issues, about two months after becoming president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi announced a huge project dubbed ‘the new Suez Canal,’ promising a huge boost of income for Egypt and drawing comparisons in the media to Gamal Abdel Nasser, when he championed the Aswan High Dam project more than 40 years ago. The project promised to upgrade and expand the Suez Canal, an important trade route between Europe and Asia. The idea was nothing new. Similar canals were built during Sadat and Mubarak's time.    The first of several promised ‘national projects,’ al-Sisi urged Egyptians to unite completely behind his vision and support the project. The project was more grounded in politics and reality than anything else.  People began to compare general-turned-president al-Sisi to Nasser, the charismatic Egyptian president who, after following a similar path to the presidency, nationalized the Suez Canal at the age of 38 and challenged Western countries’ control of the waterway. This drew strong support for Nasser and united people behind his promise of economic growth from the Suez Canal, especially after fighting off a failed invasion by Britain, France and Israel. Al-Sisi is fanning similar nationalist pride after snubbing the concerns of the United States and European Union about the coup that brought him to power. Both have also begun a nationwide crackdown against members of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Al-Sisi promised that his New Suez Canal would bring a similar much needed economic boost to the populous country’s failing economy. The project promises to create one million new jobs for Egyptians, who have long suffered from high unemployment.  Mohab Mamish, chairman of the Suez Canal Authority, promised that the project would more than double the annual revenue of the waterway, from US $5 billion to US $13.5 billion, by 2023. It would do this by allowing two-way traffic and decreasing the long waiting time for ships, allowing 87 vessels to transit daily, rather than the current limit of 49.  Widening the canal does not, however, necessarily mean that more trade will transit; that will depend on the volume of international trade. The Panama Canal, which is an important route for trade between Asia and the Americas, is also being upgraded to accommodate more traffic.  When Mamish first announced the project, the plan was to complete the digging of the new canal in three years. But, during the press event, al-Sisi stressed that they should complete the digging in just one year. The digging of the new canal and the widening of parts of the old canal are parts of a complicated process, and skeptics have raised concerns that shortening the timeline from 36 months to 12 months was unrealistic. For security reasons, the military was appointed to oversee the whole project. Several companies would be involved in the project, but it will all be under the supervision of the army. The actual excavation was then awarded to a consortium led by Bahrain-based Dar al-Handasa, in which the Egyptian army’s engineering corps is a partner. As soon as the announcement was made, television stations began broadcasting videos of bulldozers digging around the clock to meet the target. However, the tight deadline promised by al-Sisi meant that foreign companies had to be contracted to help in the digging – contrary to the original plan to depend solely on Egyptian firms – especially as the excavation quickly turned from dry digging into dredging when water was encountered early on. Dredging – the removal of underwater mud and sand – is much more difficult and expensive than dry digging. The excavation was originally planned to be dry, but water began to seep into the new canal from the older waterway as the bulldozers began moving material. The contractors reportedly have to move more than one million cubic metres daily. This added unforeseen expenses to the project, increasing exponentially the cost of the new canal. This has raised concerns about the quality of studies done before starting such a major project, or whether the studies had even been carried out. In addition to the unexpectedly high dredging expense, scientists have raised environmental concerns about the massive project. In late November 2014, a paper published in the journal Biological Invasions suggested that 350 invasive species have already made their way from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean through the old Suez Canal. Now, the new project risks doubling that number, further straining the Mediterranean ecosystem. The new Suez Canal project, like the rest of the projects announced by al-Sisi, is large and ambitious. Skeptics warn that Egyptian presidents have a history of announcing large projects that never meet their targets, such as Hosni Mubarak’s Toshka project, which aimed to reclaim millions of desert acres for agriculture and is often regarded as a huge failure. These grand projects capture the imagination of Egyptians, who have a long history of nationalist movements and strong support for the military. But, with al-Sisi’s strong backing by unquestioning media and the majority of citizens, he might not be held accountable should his grand projects fail to measure up to their ambitious promise.

Mubarak (Toshka)

Presented a the solution to Egypt’s demographic and economic issues, and the Arab World’s largest and most expensive engineering enterprise, the Toshka New Valley project has now very little to show except for evidence of ill-informed political decisions. Toshka’s premise was simple yet grandiose: to dig a 240 kilometer canal out in the Western Desert feeding off Lake Nasser’s water. The bid was to reclaim land and relocate up to 20 percent of Egyptians to this “new valley,” thus easing the country’s serious overpopulation, unemployment, and food security problems.  The idea was nothing new: it was proposed as part of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s original plans for the High Dam in Aswan, but it was abandoned in 1964. When work started at Toshka in 1997, Hosni Mubarak was only reviving Nasser’s scheme.  Toshka was less grounded in reality than in politics, and this has played into its failure, according to Emma Deputy, a doctoral student from the University of Texas at Austin, who has been researching the Egyptian mega-project as part of her dissertation. She spoke about her research at Nahdet al-Mahroussa on Wednesday night.  A look at some technical requirements show that not everything was taken into full consideration before the first ploughs started digging, and to this day, the Water Resources and Irrigation Ministry — responsible for the project — does not make public the different studies related to Toshka it may have conducted over the years. For one, the Western Desert’s high saline levels and the presence of underground aquifers in the area act as a major hindrance to any irrigation project. As the land is irrigated, the salt would mix with the aquifers and would reduce access to potable water.  The clay minerals found in the soil are also posing technical problems to the big wheeled structures moving around autonomously to irrigate the land. Often their wheels will get stuck in a little bowl created by wet clay that dried, and the irrigation machines would come to a standstill.  The aura of secrecy extends to the financial aspects of the project. Toshka’s total budget has been estimated from as low as US$83 million (according to numbers from the Egyptian government) to a whopping US$87 billion (according to the US State Department). The publicly available state budget does not mention the Toshka project. According to some figures aggregated by Deputy, less than 25 percent of the original budget has been spent already, but the results are piecemeal. The only objective met so far, she said, is the diversion of water from Lake Nasser into what little of the Sheikh Zayed Canal was built. The canal is currently 60 kilometers short of the first of the oases through which it was supposed to run, Baris. “It’s unfortunate, because Baris would have benefited from the canal,” said Deputy. Strict water management in most of the western oases has the water shutting down after 9 pm. Deputy estimates that, as of 2010, Toshka has irrigated about 16,500 feddans, but she concedes that her numbers might be too high. Conflicting government figures show that about 1,000 feddans have been reclaimed in all of Egypt from 1996 to 2010. Toshka’s original objectives were set in two phases: in the first one, the Sheikh Zayed Canal would be completed and 550,000 feddans would be reclaimed. At the end of the second phase in 2017, a total of two million feddans would have been recovered from the Western Desert. In 2005, the government announced that it was abandoning the second phase entirely and that the deadline for the project’s completion was extended to 2022. According to Deputy, canceling the second phase did not increase the project’s chances at becoming successful, because so many initial targets had not been met. “(Toshka) was failing so badly in the first place that it didn’t make a difference to cancel the second phase,” she said. Conservationist Mindy Bahaa Eddin considers Toshka an example of “disaster planning” in Egypt. She said that there is a greater need for stakeholder consultations when working out details of such large-scale projects, so that potential problems can be understood and resolved ahead of time. For example, she said, Toshka would have caused great damage to the many ancient sites found in Kharga Oasis, in a similar way that water is currently creating problems for sites in Fayoum.

Conclusion 1) Both projects were politically motivated. 2) Cost is too high to afford under the economical circumstances then and now. 3) Egyptian nation has always been the victim.

EGYPT: Morsi and Sisi in the balance

A year ago, on July 3, 2013, we witnessed the overthrow of Egypt's first democratically-elected civilian president and the first president since the January 25 revolution. The overthrow of Dr Mohamed Morsi came after just one year of his presidential term in a coup led by his Minister of Defense, Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi. It is timely to compare Morsi's one year in power with Al-Sisi's one year in power. The past 12 months have encompassed many unprecedented events, including a presidential campaign by Al-Sisi, who won an election which has been widely viewed as farcical and illegitimate.

The presidential campaigns

Comparing the ideas and policies of the coup leader, as a candidate for president upon whom many had pinned their hopes to solve Egypt's problems, with those of the deposed president, illustrates the enormous differences in vision and outlook between the two men.

During his presidential campaign, Al-Sisi was asked about some of the main issues facing Egyptians. Regarding the reoccurring electricity shortages, Al-Sisi's big idea was that every citizen should replace their light-bulbs into energy-saving bulbs and reduce their use of electrical appliances. When Morsi was asked the same question during his presidential campaign in 2012, which he titled the "Renaissance Project", he said he intended to use nuclear power to fill this deficit. Nuclear energy, he explained, would be used for electricity production. This would also create a surplus of energy which could be exported, increasing Egypt's national income.

Many Egyptians cannot even afford to buy bread and queue to buy government-subsidized bread. Al-Sisi's answer to this problem was that he would ask Egyptian families to sacrifice from the amount they eat and save just one piece of bread. "If 25 million families save a piece of bread by having three-quarters of a piece instead of a whole slice, there would be 25 million pieces of bread for those that do not have any," he argued.

Morsi, on the other hand, saw that increasing the production of wheat was the way to solve this serious problem; he suggested renting land in Sudan or Ethiopia for cultivation in order to save water. His plan was for Egypt to be self-sufficient in wheat within four years.

Regarding the shortage of foreign currency reserves (as a result of the dearth of tourists and foreign investors), Al-Sisi suggested that every Egyptian living abroad should donate $10 a month to Egypt. Morsi's solution was to increase the fee for all foreign ships passing through the Suez Canal.

With unemployment standing at 13.4 per cent of nearly 90 million Egyptians, Al-Sisi suggested buying a thousand carts for the youth to sell vegetables. For Dr Morsi, unemployment could be tackled by establishing micro-projects, such as assembling computers and televisions, and larger-scale projects such as the Suez Canal development project and other labor-intensive schemes. The Suez Canal project alone, according to Morsi, would not only increase national income but also provide up to a million jobs.

When Al-Sisi was asked for his position on the Camp David Treaty with Israel, he said that he will safeguard the agreement and will co-ordinate with Israel to protect the borders. When Dr Morsi was asked about his position, he stressed that Egypt is a country which maintains its international obligations providing other parties also keep to their commitments; it is impossible for "five million people anywhere to scare 90 million," he said.

The substantial disparity in outlook and vision of both men is evident from their handling of these issues. Whilst Al-Sisi seeks to administer a sticking-plaster to Egypt's economic wounds, Morsi's vision sought to cure the problems at their core and provide long-term solutions. "We have to produce our food, we have to produce our medicines, and we have to produce our weapons," he insisted. Al-Sisi's economic policy was hard to pinpoint during his presidential campaign, because he did not have one.

Before they reigned

So who are the two men and what was their life before entering Egyptian politics? 

Mohammed Mohammed Morsi Issa El-Ayaat was born in 1951; he obtained his bachelor's and master's degrees in Engineering at Cairo University before going to the US to complete a doctorate at Southern California University, which he completed in 1982. After completing his education, Morsi lectured in two American universities before returning to his homeland where he was appointed Professor and Dean of the School of Engineering in Al-Zaqaziq University.

Parallel to his academic career, Morsi partook in political life through the Muslim Brotherhood where he became the official parliamentary spokesman for the group after he won a parliamentary seat in the 2000 elections. He was chosen universally as the best parliamentary man for 2000-2005. In 2011, Morsi became the head of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of the Brotherhood, and was elected as a member of the Egyptian parliament in 2012; he resigned from the movement and the FJP after he won the presidential election in the same year.

Abdel Fatah Saeed Hussein Khaleel Al-Sisi, born in 1954, served in the infantry following his graduation from the Military Academy in 1977. He studied at the Wartime Military College in the US in 2006, and was appointed Egypt's military attaché to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Despite not being involved in any actual battles, Al-Sisi was promoted within the military and held several important positions, including leadership of the infantry and the Northern Command in Alexandria. He was the head of intelligence warfare before he was selected by Morsi for the position of defense minister. Al-Sisi was generally unknown to the public until his appointment as a minister in August 2012.

Elections and popularity

Morsi's victory in the 2012 presidential election was a victory for the January 25 Revolution and for democracy. The revolution was famous for the unity it created among the Egyptian people, and his winning of five consecutive votes was an indication that they were united in selecting who they wanted to lead them. This year's elections came on the back of the bloody coup which has taken the lives of over 8,000 people and seen more than 44,000 men, women and children imprisoned for their opposition to the military takeover and the annihilation of the revolution.

Moreover, whilst the 2012 elections were open for participation by all, with thirteen presidential candidates, the 2014 elections saw one puppet opponent for Al-Sisi. He won, of course, in a stark reminder of the previous six decades of authoritarian rule, with a landslide 96 per cent of the votes. Indeed, various pro-coup anti-Brotherhood parties refused to celebrate the first anniversary of the 30 June "Revolution", such as the 6th April movement and the Salafi Noor Party, in protest at the exclusion of parties from the 2014 elections and the divisions that Egypt has seen since that historic day last year.

Morsi grew in popularity when he entered the public arena, appealing to Egyptians with his humble nature. Following his election, President Morsi remained in his rented home and insisted on a modest salary of $1,650 a month. He met with members of the public frequently and prayed alongside them in the mosques. When he addressed the people in Tahrir Square following his victory, and whenever he mingled with the crowds, he refused to have bodyguards as a barrier between him and his people. From the time that he first appeared in the public eye, including his presidential campaign, Al-Sisi has not made a single public appearance, fearing for his life despite his supposed popularity with Egyptians,

Al-Sisi has limited himself to carefully choreographed interviews and indoor meetings with handpicked groups. He kept his election platform secret for most of the campaign on the grounds of "national security". His supposed popularity was propelled and fuelled by Egyptian state television alone, which compared him with former Egyptian President Nasser and made a hero-savior cult-figure out of him. This "Sisi-fever" continued despite the embarrassment that emanated from the campaign and the military's allegedly "complete cure device" for HIV and Hepatitis C. The media was quick to induce amnesia in his supporters after these embarrassments by filling the screens with their demonstration of opponents and magnifying their Egyptian Superman, Al-Sisi.

Achievements

The past 365 days under Al-Sisi have seen the breakdown of many human rights in Egypt. The sanctity of human life was squandered with 8,000 killed and 20,000 injured, with the media and even some Islamic scholars belonging to the regime, advocating and encouraging such bloodshed. Egypt has also seen the abolition of freedoms and rights with 44,000 political prisoners incarcerated in jails, including 48 journalists, and hundreds issued with death sentences in recent months.

Since the coup, Egypt has seen the closure of television channels and newspapers and the arrest of journalists and students. The country is now among 48 countries worldwide that do not enjoy any freedoms and, according to Freedom House, is regarded as a country which lacks media freedom and freedom of expression; political participation; civilian control and security-sector reform; peaceful assembly and civic activism; and judicial independence and rule of law. Egypt is back to being a police state and the military has full control over all state institutions.

During Morsi's time in office, despite the 30 protests that occurred, there was not a single fatality. The law prohibiting the arrest of those expressing opinions was cancelled and there was no longer any such thing as political prisoners. The number of tourists increased during Morsi's rule, with Egypt receiving almost seven million tourists in the first half of 2013, injecting $5 million into the economy. Following the coup and before the August massacres, tourism went down by 30 per cent, and went down to zero following the bloodshed in Cairo. When Morsi became president, foreign oil reserves had reached $14 million following the interim post-revolution military rule; that figure went up to $18.8 million. Shortly after the coup, oil reserves fell to 14.9 million; in one month alone, it fell by $3.9 million.

Morsi met with many world leaders, both at home and abroad. He attended the African Union summit where he was welcomed with great respect and was seated on the front row. Two days after the military coup in 2013 the Peace and Security Council of the African Union suspended Egypt's membership. It was readmitted reluctantly following Al-Sisi's presidential "victory", although Sam Akaki, the Director of Democratic Institutions for Poverty Reduction in Africa, has called for the withdrawal of this readmission, citing Al-Sisi's long list of human right abuses. During the recent African Summit, Egypt's Al-Sisi was seated in the third row.

History will be the judge

For Egyptians, the economy, security and personal freedoms are the key issues of concern. The past year has seen a culling of these freedoms, to a level never before seen in Egyptian history.

With Egyptians now fasting the holy month of Ramadan, many are facing severe difficulties in being able to feed their family with the increased prices of food and the continuous electricity cuts in Egypt's harsh summer heat. Indeed, Ramadan entered Egypt forlornly this year, with new laws and restrictions to dictate even the spiritual aspect of the people. Hundreds of mosques are closed; ID cards are requested for entry into those that are open; and the nightly Ramadan prayers (taraweeh) are cut short. State television is doing its best to distract the people with 30 new drama series this Ramadan, but will the Egyptian people wake from their intoxication and look at what Egypt has become, and then join the "opposition"? Time will tell.

President Morsi may not have been perfect and he may have made mistakes, but it was unreasonable to expect the country to get back on its feet in just one year after 60 years of authoritarian rule. After reviewing the "achievements" of the past year under Al-Sisi, can anyone honestly say they still support the coup?

 Comparison